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Introduction
In this talk, I shall focus on demographic processes in Europe
compared to the same demographic processes that are taking
place in the ring of states surrounding it—North Africa, the Middle
East, and also Eastern Europe. As to the time factor: There are
researchers who study demographic processes that occur over
hundreds of years, and there are those who research processes
that take place in a certain country from year to year. My talk will
relate to processes that have been occurring beginning some ten
– twenty years ago and will continue into the coming ten – twen-
ty years.
In non-professional publications, we find writers who see the
end of the demographic danger (Economist, 2007). Let us say
that it is insufficient to have a decline, even a dramatic one, in
women’s fertility in the ring of countries surrounding Europe,
because in these regions, some 50%, or only 40%, of the popu-
lations consist of children and youth. Therefore, we can expect
that in the next twenty years the population in those regions will
continue to increase greatly. This is due to the masses of young
couples who will enter the fertility period and, as a result, even if
there are a small number of children per mother, there will be a
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large addition of children in the society as a whole. And so the
demographic pressures on Europe are expected to continue from
this direction for quite some time.
Along with these comments on demography, there is also
need to discuss even if briefly, but right from the outset, the
processes and characteristics of modern migration. A distinction
must be made between internal migration within each separate
state, principally that from the village to the city—and we will
relate to this matter in due course—and immigration between
countries, international migrations. In this latter type, internation-
al migrations, we can make a distinction between migrations for
short periods of time, such as trips for purposes of tourism, work,
or studies; and permanent migration, such as takes place when
people flee from areas of distress (because of wars, terror, or nat-
ural tragedies) or seek other employment and personal security
and in general aspire to improve the quality of their lives.
United Nations figures show that in 2005, there were 191
million people who migrated from their permanent home. Of
these, 74 million went from one developing country to another
while 118 million moved from developing to developed countries.
About half of the latter went to North America and half to Europe,
and a small number to Australia (Population Reference Bureau,
Sept. 2007). The UN also reported that 2.6 million people on
average migrated every year between 1995 and 2000.
David Graham wrote an article about this phenomenon, enti-
tled "The People Paradox, Human Movements and Human
Security in a Globalizing World." He sums up the phenomenon
by arguing, though with a cautiousness appropriate for a liberal
British analyst, that a close connection exists between migration
movements and the security of states or blocs of states—like the
E.U. Graham also refers to the subject of the personal security of
the migrants. He concludes that the large immigration waves can
harm the political, cultural, social, economic, environmental, and
security homogeneity of states that are flooded with these
migrants. In the same breath, Graham adds that these fears are
traditional; that is, irrelevant to the present: "Viewed from a con-
ventional security viewpoint, population movements would only be
perceived as a threat if the influx was an invading army or sec-
ondarily, a large number of refugees" (Graham, 2000).
Like Graham, the United Nations cannot grasp migration as
a problem, except if it results from military occupation or comes
about in large waves. In his whole article, Graham devotes one
line only to the matter of Muslim immigration to Europe, about
which he states, to take a quote from another article: "Some of the
most serious threats are felt amongst European population that



























Is this a denial of reality, an avoidance of it, naivety that is per-
haps hypocritical as is customary in European academic circles
when it comes to this sensitive subject? Perhaps there is nothing
in the waves of Muslim migration that will shock the old European
order?
But when reading further, one sees in the continuation of
Graham’s article that he mentions that minorities are at times con-
sidered a Fifth Column; that there are many terrorists among
them; that they are involved in international crime organizations,
and so forth (p. 187).
My talk belongs, it seems, to the conservative stream, which
views the cumulative masses of migrants differently—as a threat if
and when there is no desire on the part of these migrants to merge
into the receiving state; if they wish to change the world outlooks,
culture, religion, and basic values of the receiving country; and
when they change, be it rapidly or gradually, the cultural, eco-
nomic, social (religious), political, and security structure of the
land that absorbs them.
Graham offers no practical and realistic advice to these issues
and how to deal with the great number of immigrants to Europe,
especially the populations arriving from North Africa and the
Middle East, who are migrants from the developing world and of
Islamic by religion.
As I mentioned, the present survey will deal only with the
recent past and the near future. It will present problems stemming
from demography differently in Europe than in its neighbors to the
south and to the east. It will also present the process that Europe
is undergoing internally in center-periphery relations as a threat
that can be transformed into a national security matter.
Demographic Processes within the E. U.
Europe’s natural increase is the lowest in the world, and in a
number of key countries (like Germany and Russia), it is negative
(Table 1).
























































Europe Population (in millions) Natural increase
Country 2007 2020 2050 2006
Poland 38.1 36.7 30.5 0
Croatia 4.4 4.3 3.8 -0.2
U.K. 61 65.8 69.2 0.3
Estonia 1.3 1.2 1.0 -0.2
Latvia 2.3 2.2 1.8 -0.5
France 61.6 66.1 70 0.4
Germany 82.3 79.6 71.4 -0.2
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria 34.1 43.2 50 1.7
Egypt 73.4 95.9 117.9 2.1
Morocco 31.7 38.9 45.3 1.5
Turkey 74 87.8 88.7 1.2
P.R.B., 2007
Thus, the local European population is not growing, and in
fact becoming smaller in several places. This means, too, that the
local population is getting older. (Table 2, Figure 1)  The propor-
tion of retirees, those receiving a pension, in the European Union
is very high at present and will reach “terrifying” rates within the
next 20-40 years.  (Figure 2, Figure 3)  In parallel with the
increase in the number of retirees, the age group of those who are
creatively productive in the economy (i.e., the work force, ages
18-65) is shrinking, and the group of children and youth (up to
age 18) is altogether disappearing.


















































Source: U.N., Ageing 2002.
Figure 1: World Population Growth 1750-2150
Figure 2: Population development until the year 2050
13
Figure 3: Population Ageing 2002-2050 
The question remains: who in the near future will sustain the
ever-growing group of retirees?  Another question: will sufficient
numbers of youth be found to be mobilized into the E.U. army, or14
that of Russia, in the near future?  Perhaps the question of ques-
tions is: will the E.U. be able to exist without absorbing immigrants
to fill the missing ranks in the productive age?
While Europe faces a shortage of youth and people of work-
ing age, natural increase in the states surrounding it to the south
and to the east is high, in fact among the highest in the world.
This population doubles itself every 30 years (Table 3).  Poverty
among this population is rampant, and political instability pushes
away people, particularly the educated, prods them to pick up
and flee.  A recent study of Arab countries found that one in two
people express a desire to leave their country and to migrate, gen-
erally to Europe.
Table 3: Changes in size of population of the Middle East
since 1800 (in millions)
A reality has been created, then, that invites migrations of
great dimensions from south of the Mediterranean, poor and
crowded, to Europe, rich but poor in young population.  An exam-
ple is provided by the migration movements in Germany, but this
holds for the rest of Europe, as well (Figure 4).  
Table 3 shows the dimensions of the migrations in the rest of
the European countries—and, on the other hand, the dimensions
of abandonment from states south of the Mediterranean.
The researcher Salt did a calculation and found that in order
to withstand the gaps being created in the work force in Europe15
Country 1800 1900 1950 1981 2006 Forecast to 2025   Forecast to 2025
(data PRB) (data WB) (data PRB)
(data PRB)
Egypt 3.5 10.0 20.0 44.0 75.4 101.0 126.0
Turkey 9.5 14.0 21.0 47.0 73.7 86.0 90.0
Iran 6.0 10.0 34.0 40.0 70.3 89.0 102.0
Iraq 1.0 2.2 5.2 14.0 26.6 44.7 64.0
Syria 1.5 2.2 3.2 9.1 19.5 28.0 36.0
Lebanon 2.0 0.5 1.5 2.6 3.9 4.6 5.0
Palestinians (Gaza+West bank )0.1 0.2 0.7 1.2 3.9 7.1 11.2
Jordan 0.2 0.3 0.5 2.0 5.6 8.0 10.0
Israel 0.2 0.5 1.5 4.0 7.2 9.3 11.0
Saudi Arabia 5.0 6.0 9.0 10.5 24.1 35.6 47.0
Emirates 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 9.1 13.2 17.4
Yemen 2.5 3.0 4.2 7.3 21.6 39.0 68.0
Oman 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9 2.6 3.1 4.0
Sudan 2.0 5.0 9.1 19.0 41.2 61.3 84.0
Total ME  Population 32.1 54.2 111.7 223.4 387.7 529.9 604.6
North Africa 6.0 10.0 22.2 48.6 81.4 103.0 119.0
and the needs of the growing group of retirees, Europe will need
between 1 and 13 million new immigrants every year between the
year 2000 and 2050 (Salt, 2001).  It should be known that the
population south of the Mediterranean is Muslim.  Islam encour-
ages a high natural increase in accordance with the biblical com-
mand of “Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth.”  By virtue of
the belief in dar al-Islam, a world that is only Muslim, Islam
encourages religious mission, from which fanatics spring up who
do not believe in democracy and who do not despise terror, jihad,
and sacrifice.  Even if 95%-99% of the Muslims do not accept ter-
ror as a way of life, a single percentage of fanatics is sufficient to
change all the rules of the game in the world and to bring about
what Huntington called a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington,
2000).
One can argue, of course, that all this is a primeval fear and
unrealistic, given the data of Europe and of the world.  For exam-
ple, the growth of the population in all of Europe totaled some 2
million people between 2005 and 2006.  Most of them were
immigrants, 1.8 million.  Thus, we are talking about merely 3.9%
of the E.U.’s total population of 462 million—in other words, a
tiny number.  In any event, the arguments continues, only 42 mil-
lion of the residents of the E.U. and the European countries
adjoining it are foreigners (Just 8.8% of the total population).
Many years will go by, it is claimed, before these foreigners “con-
quer” Europe.  (Figures based on Muenz, 2005.)
It is not difficult to refute this argument.  We know that a per-
centage of foreigners amounting to 10% is enough to create ten-
sion among various ethnic groups.  And here we have percent-
ages of foreigners that have at present reached more than this:
12.3% in Germany, 22.9% in Switzerland, and 33.9% in
Lichtenstein (Figure 5).




























Figure 5: Percent of Population that is Foreign-borne (in
Selected Countries)
What Is Europe Doing and What Can It Do?
Before we answer this question of what Europe is doing or not
doing in the face of these migratory streams into the continent, we
must ask what happens if we line up the blessings of migration
opposite the damages it causes from the viewpoint of the
European Union.
On the damage side of the column, we find threats of reli-
gious and tribal friction, harm to local cultural and political val-
ues, and perhaps threats of terror.  On the benefit side, immigra-
tion solves the labor shortage and so maintains the strength and
efficiency of the European economy.  In the short run, immigration
solves some of the economic problems.  However, if Europe is
flooded with millions of immigrants, a potential that exists from
North Africa and the Middle East, most of them poor, ill, unedu-
cated, and Muslim, their assimilation into Europe will be very dif-
ficult because of the great difference that exists between the
absorbing population and the population absorbed.
The dangers of immigration are possibly not immediate and
lie in wait only in the longer run.  In any case, the European Union
may possibly have missed the train.  Can France today chase out
3-4-6 million African immigrants, most of them Muslim?  No way.
Can it prevent the entry of family relatives of these immigrants?
Apparently it cannot now do so.  Can it send back to their coun-
tries of origin hundreds of thousands of people who infiltrated into17
France illegally?  Europe may have set up hundreds of detention
camps for these infiltrators (See Map 6), but these acts are too
late, too little, and ineffective.
Figure 6: Detention Camps for Illegal Immigrants in Europe
(2005) 
Between the “sit and do nothing,” “business as usual” states
and states that take action and change trends, it seems that
Europe has chosen an intermediate strategy.  It indeed recognizes
a threat to the foundations of European society and does every-
thing to minimize this threat.  Nonetheless, it faces a dilemma: on
the one hand, it is interested in transmitting to itself, to its neigh-
bors, and to the world at large messages of brotherhood among
nations, understanding to the weak, and humanitarianism; at the
same time, however, it is acting to put a brake to immigration into
it.  I derive this conclusion on the basis of Europe’s deeds, which
do not exactly accord with its declarations: Europe refuses to
admit Muslim Turkey into the E.U., and there is only one possible
explanation for this—the fear of adding 70 million Muslims more
to the 20-30 million that already are ensconced in Europe.
18
Europe recently appended Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
the Baltic states and is now in the process of admitting Bulgaria
and Romania.  The only explanation that I can offer for these steps
is that a decision was taken (perhaps in the proverbial smoke-
filled room) to admit Christian countries, from which will come the
needed labor force to generate Western Europe’s economy in the
coming years.  No more use of cheap Muslim labor, but Christian
workers now.  At the same time, Europe is erecting detention
camps, building fences and walls on its external borders, and
strengthening fleets that are to restrict the dimensions of the infil-
tration of illegal immigrants into the continent.
But Europe can do much more to respond to the expected
shortage of young labor on the continent:
It can postpone the retirement age from 65 to 70 or even 75.
In this way, millions of workers will return to work who are enter-
ing the senior age. The work week can possibly be extended,
thereby gaining millions of hours now missing from the European
economy.
Other steps may be taken in the trend to increase the limited
labor force; for instance, to admit more women who take care of
children into the employment cycle by awarding grants and incen-
tives and having support systems for them.
It is not unavoidable that advertising efforts, accompanied by
much economic support, will reverse the wheel of childbirth and
women will be encouraged to have more children.
In parallel to this activity within Europe, Europe will assist the
states of the ring surrounding it to the south with financing and
development means.  It is clear to Europe that every additional
person absorbed into the labor force in Morocco or Egypt or in
the southern Sahara will give up on his intention to migrate to
Europe.
Demography on the European Internal Front
A Strong Center vs. Weak Peripheries
The demographic phenomenon of a strong economic center
vs. the poor and sinking peripheral areas is nothing new, but it has
intensified in the era of globalization.  Economic concerns that
embrace the world are not interested in the national marginalities.
Economic efficiency is found in the power centers in the giant
cities and close to international airports.  The consequence is well
known: millions all over the world abandon the rural regions and
villages and stream toward the center cities.  However, in the large
economic blocs there is another trend: states of the center—the
core—France, Germany, and the Benelux countries, found to the

























































and they attract more and more of the labor force, capital, and
culture, and do so at the expense of the crumbling periphery.  The
result is that Paris, Frankfort, Stuttgart, Brussels, and London
become ever more powerful while the more distant peripheral
countries like Poland, Eastern Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, and
the Baltic states, experience a negative migration, with the best of
their youth streaming toward the core states and their cities and
leaving the periphery desolate (Table 4).  
Table 4: Migration in Representative States in Europe and Its
Environs
I. States Absorbing Immigration
II. States outside Europe Exporting Immigrants
III. States within Europe Exporting Immigrants
Source: International Migration Movement, 2006, 2002, PRB
200620
2002 population 2006 population
(per 1000) (per 1000)
Ireland 4.9 18,000 13 57,000
U.K. 1.6 95,000 4.0 244,000
Germany 2.3 185,000 1.2 100,000
France 0.7 38,000 2.0 123,000
Italy 200 118,000 5.8 344,000
Croatia 2.6 11,500
2002 population 2006 population
(per 1000) (per 1000)
Algeria -1.8 52,000 - 1.0 52,000
Egypt -1.2 80,000 - 2.0 146,000
Morocco -1.5 44,000 - 2.0 63,000
Sudan -2.6 77,000 - 1.0 38,000
Tunisia -0.8 8,000 - 1.0 10,000
Total 
North Africa -1.6 261,000 329,000
Turkey -0.8 54,000 - 5.9 436,600
Georgia -5.78 30,000 - -
2002 population 2006 population
(per 1000) (per 1000)
Albania -19 60,000 - 3.0 90,000
Latvia -2.0 5,000 - 1.0 23,000
Estonia -8.0 10,400 - 0.3 5,000
Bulgaria -4.9 37,730 - 1.8 13,800
Poland -0.5 20,000 - 1.0 38,000
Romania -0.5 12,000 - 0.5 100,000




























This is a threat to the social-cultural-economic well-being of
the countries of the periphery in the E.U., and the danger in this
development is no less than the external threats described above.
The processes of aging that were mentioned earlier are accel-
erated, as well, in these states, and the future picture is not all
rosy.  The interrelationship of the three phenomena may be found
in the power centers of Europe.  In the large cities, migrants from
elsewhere on the globe (generally Muslims) meet those from the
country's peripheral regions, and the cities become very cosmo-
politan, with inevitable tension among the locals, the domestic
foreigners as it were, and the external foreigners (Figure 7).   It is
not by chance that most of the race-related incidents occur there.
Figure 7: Immigrants in the big cities of Germany (2000)
Conclusion
The economic-cultural-democratic flowering of the European
Union does not ensure its general security or the national securi-
ty of its member states.
We have pointed out that the demography of Europe consti-
tutes a real threat to its economic and societal foundations and
























































those living in Europe might alter the character of the continent
from end to end.
Despite the fact that it is not nice or politic to say these things
aloud, we are facing a clash of two civilizations: local Christian vs.
Islam, which is immigrating within.  The process may be wrapped
in words of one kind or another, but the phenomenon is clear.  It
is a process, as we have hinted, that is also related to demogra-
phy.  The economic centers are flowering and prospering, but at
the expense of each nation's periphery and of the marginal areas
of the European Union as a whole.
Europe is in a complex demographic bind: on the one hand,
it has an honest desire for equality, humaneness, and assisting the
weak; on the other hand, there are large fears of the continuing
mass immigrations, that they might cause the loss of its identity
and the loss of its security.
In the meantime, the population of Europe is becoming small-
er and older while the countries outside the EU are growing faster
and poorer, and their residents want to enjoy the best that Europe
can offer them.
Expansion of the member states of the European Union pro-
vides one answer to the process; however, it also leads to increas-
ing the gap between center and periphery within the EU itself.
As we have pointed out, some of the existing problems have
a solution, whether immediate or long term.  Among others, there
is need to change European foreign policy.  Thus, for example, the
relationship to the Turkish army and to its function in maintaining
democracy in that country may be changed.  Another example is
the possibility of aiding the ring states with the intention of reduc-
ing their negative migration.
In conclusion, I will pose a question: if Europe's geostrategic-
demographic-economic policy were to fail, what then?  What will
happen?
In such a case, the population of Europe will undergo a
change, and it will gradually turn into a more varied human
mosaic than at present.  Ethnic tensions will worsen, as will gaps
between center and periphery, rich and poor.  The foundations of
democracy in Europe will be undermined even further than what
is happening today.  As a counter-response, one can expect the
rise of racist movements in Europe and attempts to push out for-
eigners.  Terror, violence, fanaticism will grow stronger and
accompany Europe for many years to come.
The dream of the fall of walls of separation, of a continent
without the need for armies, of a world all at peace—this dream
affects Europe and the readiness of its inhabitants to understand
the world correctly.  This dream, which affects the entire world, is





























relationship between demography and the national security of the
states of Europe and that of the E. U. as a whole.
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